What's with the bold type, Lo? Can we not read something quieter? Be wary of overkill.
HEZBOLLAH'S "VICTORY"
By Charles Krauthammer
Friday, September 1, 2006; Page A21
"We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 . . . that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not."
-- Hasan Nasrallah,
Hezbollah leader, Aug. 27
{This played well in Lebanon. He's talking about the stunning response. He also wants to get off the hook, which he apparently has. Lucky fellow.}
"So much for the "strategic and historic victory" Nasrallah had claimed less than two weeks earlier. What real victor declares that, had he known, he would not have started the war that ended in triumph?
{Uh, one who's still in the game and has garnered more support for his actions. One who wishes to register great surprise for Israel's overreaction. One who's politically shrewd. One who's reaped industrial-strength support across the Arab world because instead of being quickly defeated as usual, held the IDF at bay. Krauthammer's an old painter. Same picture over and over.}
Nasrallah's admission, vastly underplayed in the West, makes clear what the Lebanese already knew. Hezbollah may have won the propaganda war, but on the ground it lost. Badly.
{Not so badly. The IDF established only one position at the river. On the last day of fighting, the Hezbollah fighters launched their largest number of rockets. Each time the IDF attempted to wipe out a Hezbollah group, the H. held them off. The Israeli tanks lumbered into positions and were blasted by anti-tank rocket fire. The Israeli troops, for the first time in an action against Arabs, had to fall back and re-group. They were dismayed. Easy for Charles to tell us what went on, but he's in D.C. Reports from the field tell us otherwise.}
True, under the inept and indecisive leadership of Ehud Olmert, Israel did miss the opportunity to militarily destroy Hezbollah and make it a non-factor in Israel's security, Lebanon's politics and Iran's foreign policy. Nonetheless, Hezbollah was seriously hurt. It lost hundreds of its best fighters.
{But, Charles, Israel's stated purpose was to DESTROY Hezbollah, to wipe it out. That, m'friend, didn't happen.}
A deeply entrenched infrastructure on Israel's border is in ruins.
{Please, Charles, what IS a "deeply entrenched infrastructure"? Normally we think of "infrastructure" as roads, railroads, you know, the stuff that keeps the groceries rolling. I don't know of any that are, well, "deeply entrenched." If you're talking about the battlements from which Hezbollah fought, they remained dug in. The IDF couldn't dislodge them enough to roll to the river.}
The great hero has had to go so deep into hiding that Nasrallah has been called "the underground mullah."
{By whom?}
Most important, Hezbollah's political gains within Lebanon during the war have proved illusory. As the dust settles, the Lebanese are furious at Hezbollah for provoking a war that brought them nothing but devastation -- and then crowing about victory amid the ruins.
{We have to realize that Charles is not reporting from the ground, where the dust settles over the ruins. Several reporters for several papers and electronic media have interviewed Lebanese who confirm that the Mullah's claims are spot on.}
The Western media were once again taken in by the mystique of the "Arab street." The mob came out to cheer Hezbollah for raining rockets on Israel -- surprise! -- and the Arab governments that had initially criticized Hezbollah went conveniently silent. Now that the mob has gone home, Hezbollah is under renewed attack -- in newspapers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, as well as by many Lebanese, including influential Shiite academics and clan leaders. The Arabs know where their interests lie. And they do not lie with a Shiite militia that fights for Iran.
{Read this as neo-con illusion: their interests lie with Israel and the United States, where the real money is, and where George Bush is known to have the biggest stick. Got it, Charles.}
Even before the devastation, Hezbollah in the last election garnered only about 20 percent of the vote, hardly a mandate.
{Not bad for terrorists, eh?}
Hezbollah has guns, however, and that is the source of its power.
{As Christopher Walken might say, "Wowee!" How can you take this man seriously?}
But now even that is threatened. Hence Nasrallah's admission. He knows that Lebanon, however weak its army, has a deep desire to disarm him and that the arrival of Europeans in force, however weak their mandate, will make impossible the rebuilding of the vast Maginot Line he spent six years constructing.
{Talking points: Keep referring to World War II. Call them Nazis, facists, Hitler, etc. And, even though it's a tiny country, use "vast."}
Which is why the expected Round Two will, in fact, not happen. Hezbollah is in no position, either militarily or politically, for another round. Nasrallah's admission that the war was a mistake is an implicit pledge not to repeat it, lest he be completely finished as a Lebanese political figure.
{I hope you're right, Charles. It would be glorious to experience The End of Retaliation.}
The Lebanese know that Israel bombed easy-to-repair airport runways when it could have destroyed the new airport terminal and set Lebanon back 10 years. The Lebanese know that Israel attacked the Hezbollah TV towers when it could have pulverized Beirut's power grid, a billion-dollar reconstruction. The Lebanese know that the next time, Israel's leadership will hardly be as hesitant and restrained. Hezbollah dares not risk that next time.
{A marvelous display of restraint, Charles, and if I didn't know that you lived in D.C., I would suspect you of having an inside line on what the Israelis MIGHT have done if they REALLY wanted to punish those naughty Lebanese.}
Even more important is the shift once again in the internal Lebanese balance of power. With Nasrallah weakened, the other major factions are closing in around him. Even his major Christian ally, Michel Aoun, has called for Hezbollah's disarmament. The March 14 democratic movement has regained the upper hand and, with outside help, could marginalize Hezbollah.
{Right, the democratic movement and freedom taking over in the New Middle East. I'll hold my breath on this one.}
In a country this weak, outsiders can be decisive.
{Watch your tongue, Charles. We're not "outsiders." We occupy Afghanistan and Iraq, and we're pretty chummy with Israel. Maybe Arabs consider us "outsiders," but I suspect we feel, well, entitled.}
A strong European presence in the south, serious U.S. training and equipment for the Lebanese army,
{Such as that the U.S. provides in Iraq?}
and relentless pressure at the United Nations
{Which Mr. Bush and Co. admire for its relentlessness}
can tip the balance.
{Oh, we're at a tipping point? I thought Nasrallah had blown it.}
We should be especially aggressive at the United Nations in pursuing the investigation of Syria for the murder of Rafiq Hariri and in implementing resolutions mandating the disarmament of Hezbollah.
{I buy this.}
It was just 18 months ago that the democrats of the March 14 movement expelled Syria from Lebanon and rose to power, marking the apogee of the U.S. democratization project in the region.
{Isn't it amazing that this guy can talk so confidently about our "project" in the Middle East. He, like many who now lead us, believes this Imperialistic malarky.}
Nasrallah's temporary rise during the just-finished war marked that project's nadir. Nasrallah's crowing added to the general despair in Washington about a rising "Shiite crescent" stretching from Tehran to Beirut.
In fact, Hezbollah was seriously set back, as was Iran. In the Middle East, however, promising moments pass quickly. This one needs to be seized.
{Jesus, it's the oldest civilization we know. NOTHING moves quickly in the Middle East. It's hot there, Charles. Not much air conditioning. Carpe Diem is a poetic Western concept. Cool it.}
We must pretend that Security Council Resolution 1701 was meant to be implemented and exert unrelieved pressure on behalf of those Lebanese -- a large majority -- who want to do the implementing."
Yeah, right, on behalf of the Lebanese, let's pretend. Thanks, Charles.
Bob
[This message has been edited by Robert J. Clawson (edited September 04, 2006).]
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